University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
NotiCen

Latin America Digital Beat (LADB)

7-30-2015

Conflict Between Rival Gangs, Police Produces
War-Like Casualty Numbers in El Salvador
Benjamin Witte-Lebhar

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/noticen
Recommended Citation
Witte-Lebhar, Benjamin. "Conflict Between Rival Gangs, Police Produces War-Like Casualty Numbers in El Salvador." (2015).
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/noticen/10268

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NotiCen by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu.

LADB Article Id: 79712
ISSN: 1089-1560

Conflict Between Rival Gangs, Police Produces War-Like
Casualty Numbers in El Salvador
by Benjamin Witte-Lebhar
Category/Department: El Salvador
Published: 2015-07-30
A surge in El Salvador’s already ghastly homicide numbers has sent the government of President
Salvador Sánchez Cerén scrambling for solutions and prompted more than a few mentions of "war"
as observers struggle to make sense of the Central America nation’s unraveling security situation.
Violent crime, driven in large part by powerful street gangs known as maras or pandillas, is a
perennial problem in El Salvador, which routinely ranks as one of the world’s most murderous
noncombat countries (NotiCen, June 30, 2011). In the last decade—not counting 2012 and 2013,
when an experimental gang truce led to a significant drop in killings (NotiCen, July 12, 2012)—the
country averaged close to 3,900 murders per year, nearly 23 times the number killed annually in the
US state of Massachusetts, which is roughly the same size as El Salvador, in both surface area and
population.
El Salvador’s "normal" homicide rate, therefore, is between 300 and 350 per month, which is why
the body count so far this year is all the more astonishing. In March, 482 people were murdered,
making it the deadliest single month in more than a decade, the Instituto de Medicina Legal (IML),
a branch of the Corte Suprema de Justicia (CSJ), reported. The next month saw 421 murders. And
in May and June, the totals jumped to a devastating 641 and 677, respectively, numbers unheard of
since El Salvador’s dozen-year civil war (1980-1992), which resulted in an estimated 75,000 deaths
and 8,000 disappearances (NotiCen, Oct. 27, 2011).
"There used to be areas that were more or less calm," Sigfrido Vitan Marín, a forensic doctor, told
the US media organization National Public Radio (NPR) earlier this month. "But now there isn't one
place in all of El Salvador that’s safe."
With nearly 3,000 murders in just the first six months of the year, a 55.7% increase over the same
period in 2014, El Salvador is on record pace and will likely regain the dubious distinction of
having the world’s highest per capita homicide rate among countries not technically at war. The
top spot is now held by neighboring Honduras (90.4 murders per 100,000 inhabitants), followed by
Venezuela (53.7 per 100,000) and Belize (44.7 per 100,000), according to the most recent Global Study
on Homicide (2013) by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
El Salvador, with a homicide rate of 41.2 per 100,000, ranked fourth on that list, which was compiled
using numbers from 2012, when Salvadoran authorities helped broker a tregua (truce) between rival
maras that brought the annual murder totals down, in both 2012 and 2013, to approximately 2,500.
In June 2013, when the truce was still in place, there were an average of six murders per day in El
Salvador. Last month’s daily average was 22.

"We’re at war"
The UNODC ranking considers countries that are technically not at war. But with violence levels
unseen in El Salvador since the 1992 peace accords, many people are now questioning whether that
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distinction even applies in this case. The mayhem may not be motivated, as it was during the civil
war, by competing political ideologies. But the results of the conflict—between competing pandillas,
between gangs and state security forces (police and soldiers), and with innocent civilians caught in
the crossfire—are comparable in the rising casualty numbers, terror, and displacement.
IML director Miguel Fortín Magaña, in comments to reporters last month, described the situation
as an "unofficial war" that is "one step away from being a frontal clash." Government spokesperson
Eugenio Chicas, in a June 22 press conference, also used the word "war," saying, "Criminal groups
have decided to declare war on the state."
So far this year, some 35 police officers, more than a dozen soldiers, and one state prosecutor have
been killed. Nearly 40 police were murdered in 2014, up from 14 the year before.
Former guerrilla fighter Raúl Mijango, who served as lead mediator during the now defunct truce
(NotiCen, Dec. 20, 2012), doesn’t dispute the terminology but told the Spanish new agency EFE that,
from the perspective of the maras, the hostilities were provoked by the government, not the other
way around. "The gangs think it was the government that declared war on them," he said.
Mijango said the decisive moment took place Jan. 5, when President Sánchez Cerén turned his back
on the tregua once and for all by saying his government could not "go back to the scheme of trying
to understand each other and negotiating" with the pandillas. "Gang members have decided to
become outlaws, so it’s our duty to go after them, punish them, and let the justice system determine
their [prison] sentences," Sánchez Cerén, a guerrilla commander during the civil war, added.
Two weeks later, Vice President Óscar Ortiz upped the ante by saying that police, in cases where
they feel threatened, are free to shoot gang members "without any fear of suffering consequences."
Ricardo Salvador Martínez, the head of internal affairs with the PNC, went even further in a
February interview with La Prensa Gráfica, suggesting that citizens should also have a free hand
to "defend themselves" against the gang threat. "We’re at war. And in this war, the criminals are
beating us," he said. "The problem here is that this is a country that is highly armed, and the people
are starting to defend themselves against the acts that the criminals are committing. I don’t see this
as being either a good or a bad thing. What I do think is that the evildoers, the pandilleros, will start
easing up on their actions because they see that the people aren’t going to be pushed around so
easily."

New gang leaders
Critics of the tregua, which began in March 2012 at the behest of then President Mauricio Funes
(2009-2014) and lasted approximately two years (April 26, 2012, and April 24, 2014), say it empowered
the maras and allowed them time to gather strength. The IML’s Fortín Magaña described the truce
recently as an "aberration" and said the current "vortex of violence" is a direct result of the failed
policy.
But others say that the truce was El Salvador’s last best hope and that by abandoning it—and
transferring the jailed leaders involved in the truce back into high-security prisons, where they
are cut off from their underlings—the government inadvertently allowed a new, wilder generation
to take control of the maras. "You take away the mature leadership, and you get a structure that
is made up of younger, fanatical people who want to make a name for themselves," Mijango, the
former truce facilitator, told EFE. "They want war."
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Journalist Carlos Martínez, in an essay published June 7 by the independent news site El Faro,
offered a similar analysis, saying that, once the older generation of gang leaders was sent back into
high-security lockup and essentially muted, there was nothing left to hold together the various
factions that divide the country’s street gangs. "Once the national leadership structure was broken,
every big shot, every local district chief, became a little king," he wrote. "The organizations were
left in the hands of midlevel leaders, many of whom never liked the idea of negotiating with the
government or trying to settle differences with the rival gang."
Something similar occurred within the police force, Martínez argued. In pursuing the truce strategy,
the Funes administration relied on a very tight circle of operators and decision makers. Police had
no say in the matter and were expected just to follow orders, which for many, after serving for years
on the front lines in the fight against gangs, was uncomfortable at best and humiliating at worse.
Now, in the current climate, they’ve suddenly been given a free hand to strike back.

Hard-line approach
Analysts say the governing Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), afraid it
might lose the tight 2014 presidential contest, dumped the unpopular truce experiment for political
reasons. The FMLN’s Sánchez Cerén, who served as vice president under Funes, ended up winning
the contest, but just barely, beating former San Salvador mayor Norman Quijano of the hard-right
Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) by fewer than 6,400 votes (NotiCen, March 20, 2014)
The Sánchez Cerén administration insists it won’t try for a second truce. But it has promised to
help gang members by providing inmates with expanded training and social-reinsertion services.
The proposals are part of a US$2.1 billion Plan El Salvador Seguro that the president unveiled in
January (NotiCen, Jan. 29, 2015). The prevention-focused plan also calls for constructing parks,
sports facilities, and education and training centers in the country’s 50 most violent municipalities,
job-creation programs for youth, and infrastructure improvements to the country’s dilapidated and
grossly overcrowded prison system.
The president took another promising step in March, when he led a massive anti-violence
demonstration in San Salvador, the capital (NotiCen, April 16, 2015). An estimated 500,000, many
dressed all in white, participated in the rallies nationwide. Sánchez Cerén made a pitch for national
unity and announced "gang-member reinsertion" legislation.
Since then, however, the administration’s prevention-oriented promises have been largely eclipsed
by its more obvious law-and-order measures, which include recent moves to garrison police, put
more soldiers into crime-fighting roles, step up arrests, and, for strategic reasons, shuffle thousands
of inmates into different prison facilities.
"We’re not against the idea of people talking. We’re not against efforts being made to rehabilitate
[gang members]," Security Minister Benito Lara said in a July 16 speech in Ciudad Delgado. "But
this government, as President Sánchez Cerén himself said, promised to enter a phase of cracking
down hard on crime in this country, and that decision stands."

-- End --
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